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economic viability of mutually beneficial relationships between the constituent 
parties in these systems relies on the ability of each party to effectively quantify and 
reason over uncertainty in order to facilitate rational decision-making.  Service 
provision in Grid systems is one such relationship, in which uncertainty is 
experienced by the service provider in his ability to deliver a given quality level due 
to inherent behavioural factors, such as load fluctuations and equipment failures, and 
due to statistical factors relating to the use of past empirical data for future prediction.  
Inability of the provider to effectively quantify and reason over these behavioural and 
statistical uncertainties can result in errors in the estimation of quality levels 
consistent with business objectives.  Emblematic consequences of such errors include 
loss of revenue, inefficient resource usage and erosion of consumer trust.  To address 
this, we propose a utility model for contract-based service provision which extends 
common economic utility models and facilitates explicit reasoning over the 
uncertainties in quality levels.  We couple this model with a monitoring policy which 
enables the mitigation of statistical uncertainty in quality levels under the constraint 
of costs for information acquisition. 
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Abstract
Uncertainty is an inherent property of open, distributed
and multi-party systems. The economic viability of mutu-
ally beneficial relationships between the constituent parties
in these systems relies on the ability of each party to effec-
tively quantify and reason over uncertainty in order to fa-
cilitate rational decision-making. Service provision in Grid
systems is one such relationship, in which uncertainty is ex-
perienced by the service provider in his ability to deliver
a given quality level due to inherent behavioural factors,
such as load fluctuations and equipment failures, and due to
statistical factors relating to the use of past empirical data
for future prediction. Inability of the provider to effectively
quantify and reason over these behavioural and statistical
uncertainties can result in errors in the estimation of quality
levels consistent with business objectives. Emblematic con-
sequences of such errors include loss of revenue, inefficient
resource usage and erosion of consumer trust. To address
this, we propose a utility model for contract-based service
provision which extends common economic utility models
and facilitates explicit reasoning over the uncertainties in
quality levels. We couple this model with a monitoring pol-
icy which enables the mitigation of statistical uncertainty in
quality levels under the constraint of costs for information
acquisition.
1 Introduction
Uncertainty is a central characteristic of domains where
parties cease to retain complete control over outcomes in
which they express preference. Open, distributed and multi-
party systems demonstrate uncertainty with salience; with
outcomes in such systems subject to inherent stochastic-
ity and to the partial or complete control of auxiliary au-
tonomous parties. The economic viability of the mutually
beneficial relationships which motivate these systems is re-
∗Supported in part by EPSRC grant EP/C009797/1 “Dynamic Operat-
ing Policies for Commercial Hosting Environments” and EU Network of
Excellence grant 026764 “Resilience for Survivability in IST”.
liant on the ability of each party to quantify and reason over
the uncertainty in outcomes in which they express prefer-
ence. This facilitates the expectations of candidate out-
comes to be established by each party, and a rational or-
dering of preferences over those uncertain outcomes formu-
lated.
Grid systems [3] are pertinent examples of open, dis-
tributed and multi-party systems, uniting disparate re-
sources from varied autonomous domains in a single large-
scale system. A fundamental and motivating relationship in
Grid systems is that of service provision, in which a ser-
vice provider supplies some well-defined functionality, a
service, for consumption by a service consumer. The qual-
ity of the supplied service is stipulated by a set of quality
level guarantees pertaining to the availability and perfor-
mance of the service. These guarantees, along with pay-
ment terms for their fulfilment or violation, are formalised
in a bilateral contract between provider and consumer es-
tablished prior to the usage of the service. The formulation
and proposition of the appropriate quality level guarantees
is the task of the provider, and is motivated by the busi-
ness objectives of the provider, for example, profitability,
reliability and trustworthiness. Quality levels are, though,
subject to uncertainty, attributable to inherent behavioural
factors, such as fluctuations in load and equipment failures,
and to statistical factors arising from the uncertainty of es-
timating future behaviour using past empirical data. Propo-
sition of quality guarantees should therefore not only reflect
business objectives, but should additionally consider the un-
certainty in the outcome(s) perceived to fulfil these business
objectives. Inability of the provider to effectively quantify
and reason over this uncertainty in the negotiation of service
provision contracts can lead to errors in the estimation of
those quality levels which most closely reflect business ob-
jectives. Emblematic consequences of such errors include
loss of revenue, inefficient resource usage and erosion of
consumer trust.
The provider requires a methodology for both the quan-
tification of behavioural uncertainty in quality levels, and
for reasoning over this uncertainty facilitating explicit con-
sideration in the negotiation of service provision contracts,
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and ensuring consistency of proposed quality levels with
business objectives. We address the need for methodolo-
gies facilitating the quantification of, and reasoning over un-
certainty in quality levels for a service provider. Common
economic models are extended to yield a utility model for
contract-based service provision enabling reasoning over
the business objectives of the provider under uncertainty
in quality levels. Behavioural uncertainty in quality levels
is represented through the use of a random variables with
some given probability distribution. This enables the ex-
pectation of a given quality level to be established and in-
corporated into the reasoning process and formulation of
the service provision contract. A monitoring policy is then
presented to enable the mitigation of statistical uncertainty
in a quality level, and thus the derivation of a probability
distribution using empirical data. To reflect the opportunity
cost of intrusive resource usage by this monitoring policy,
we associate a cost with the acquisition of empirical data
and incorporate this cost into the reasoning process of the
provider. We demonstrate the utilisation of a cost-benefit
analysis to converge on a level of monitoring which effec-
tively balances the cost of information acquisition and the
mitigation of statistical uncertainty in the derived probabil-
ity distribution. It is shown that beyond a certain level of
monitoring, the costs of monitoring outweigh the benefits
in terms reduction in statistical uncertainty in the probabil-
ity distribution. The practical efficacy of our utility model
and monitoring policy is demonstrated through their incor-
poration into a lightweight management architecture based
on Representational State Transfer.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We
present our utility model for contract-based service provi-
sion in Section 2, and utilise this model in Section 3 to
demonstrate the negative consequences of inaccuracy in sta-
tistical uncertainty in quality levels. Our monitoring policy
is then discussed in Section 4 and the results illustrating the
efficacy of our approach are presented in Section 5. The im-
plementation of our utility model and monitoring policy is
demonstrated in Section 6. and we conclude our work with
a brief summary and discussion in Section 7.
2 Utility Model for Contract-Based Service
Provision
In this section, we extend common economic utility
models to define a utility model for contract-based service
provision. We show how this utility model can be utilised
to yield the quality level which most closely fulfils business
objectives from a given service provision contract, given no
statistical uncertainty.
The model we propose has similarities with that pre-
sented by Huberman et al in [5] and utilised in subsequent
work by Byde in [1], yet our approach has some fundamen-
tal differences. In [1, 5], as in our model, a probability is as-
sociated with a given quality level to denote the behavioural
uncertainty in the delivery of that quality level. This facili-
tates the explicit inclusion of uncertainty in the negotiation
of each service provision contract. The formulation of this
probability and quality level, and the potential for statistical
uncertainty are, though, not discussed in [1, 5]. Addition-
ally, the negotiation protocol and payment functions defined
in the model consider only on the probability of meeting
the quality level, not the quality level itself. We consider a
more natural approach to be to negotiate over a quality level
rather than the probability of a quality level. We therefore
utilise a negotiation protocol and payment functions which
explicitly consider the quality level yet we retain the abil-
ity to reason over the uncertainty in each quality level using
probability distributions.
Definition 1. A quality level is a tuple q = (m, v), where m
is some chosen quality metric (such as response time) and
v ∈ R is an assigned value for m (such as 300 milliseconds
as bound for response time).
A quality level can be viewed an assignment of value, v,
to a variable m. Implicit in this assignment is a bounding
relation, r ∈ {≤,≥}. For a given metric, m, the bound-
ing relation r will reflect the nature of the metric. For in-
stance, a temporal metric, such as response time, would be
bound by≤, reflecting the intuition that one wishes to guar-
antee times are lower than a given value, v. Conversely, a
throughput metric, such as jobs per minute, would be bound
by ≥, reflecting the intuition that one wishes to guarantee
throughput is greater than a given value v. The intuition be-
hind these bounds dictates that their explicit stipulation in
q is superfluous, as for a given metric the bounding relation
will remain constant. Without loss of generality, we restrict
our attention to a single quality level guarantee, q, in each
contract.
The service provision contract takes the form of a contin-
gent contract [6]. Such contracts are regularly utilised when
product quality can only be determined once the product
has been consumed, and seek to reduce consumer risk from
the uncertainty pertaining to quality. The contract defines
payments which are contingent on the supply of a given
outcome x ∈ X . Without loss of generality, we define a
simple outcome set X = {q,¬q}, where q represents the
supply of the service with the quality level fulfilled, and
¬q represents supply of the service with the quality level
violated. In addition to a non-contingent ex ante payment
by the consumer, we define an ex post contingent payment
paid by the service provider if x = ¬q. Both payments are
functions of the quality level guaranteed, and are not contin-
gent on the delivered quality level, qd. The outcome set, X ,
could be augmented with additional contingency payments,
and these payments could be contingent on q d rather than q.
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Our focus remains on a simple binary outcome set for ease
of explication.
Definition 2. A service provision contract is a tuple a =
(c, p, q, gm(v), hm(v)). c and p define the service consumer
and service provider respectively, q is the contracted quality
level, gm(v) is an ex ante payment from the consumer to
the provider for provision of the service with quality q, and
hm(v) is an ex post contingent payment from provider to
consumer, payable on violation of the quality level guaran-
tee q.
The negotiation protocol we assume for the service pro-
vision contract is a simplistic proposal protocol. The ser-
vices provider formulates a contract for the service, a,
with a given quality level guarantee, q, and payment terms,
gm(v) and hm(v). The contract is communicated to the
consumer who analyses the quality level guarantee and pay-
ment terms. Acceptance of the consumer is dependant on
the contract exceeding some reservation utility, U c, which
represents the utility derived from rejection of the contract.
This decision-making process would itself include quantifi-
cation and reasoning over uncertainty in the quality level,
yet we retain focus on the decision-making of the provider.
The simple acceptance or rejection decision of the con-
sumer leaves bargaining power in the contract negotiation
with the provider. The provider is free to propose only those
contracts with quality level guarantees and payment terms
which most closely fulfil business objectives, that is, those
contract which exceed some reservation utility, U p, which
represents the utility from not proposing the given contract.
Given the negotiation protocol, the provider requires a
reasoning process to determine the quality level guaran-
tee and payment terms to include in a given service pro-
vision contract. We utilise the ubiquitous economic notion
of utility to order outcomes according to preference, and
extend this notion to include consideration of uncertainty
in outcomes using expected utility. An assumption is made
that the provider is risk-neutral, and thus will prefer that
outcome which probabilistically maximises expected util-
ity. The business objective of the provider is assumed to
be maximum returns/profit, enabling utility and profit to be
synonymous.
Let V ∗m denote a continuous random variable represent-
ing the quality level for a given metric m. This random
variable represents the inherent behavioural uncertainty in
the quality level. We assume that such uncertainty is in-
herent due to the potential scale of system and the inability
to objective quantify all possible influencing factors. The
underlying objective probability density function for V ∗m is
denoted f ∗m(v), where vmin ≤ v ≤ vmax. The objective
nature of the density function dictates its representation of
the most accurate quantification of behavioural uncertainty
possible. Let the ex ante payment for a given metric m with
value v be defined by the function gm(v), and the ex post
payment for violation of metric m with value v be defined
by hm(v). For a given contract, we yield the expected util-
ity function, EUm(v), in Equation 1.
EUm(v) = gm(v)−
∫ vmax
v
f∗m(v)dv · hm(v) (1)
The bounds of integration, in this case v and vmax, de-
termine the range of values over which the quality level
guarantee is deemed to have been violated, and thus an ex
post payment necessitated. These bounds are dependant on
bounding relation for metric m. For instance, a bound-
ing relation of ≤ would yield integration bounds of v and
vmax. Conversely, a bounding relation of≥ would yield in-
tegration bounds of vmin and v. The functions gm(v) and
hm(v) reflect the business objectives of the provider, defin-
ing the payment terms for a given quality level guarantee, q.
EUm(v) consequently enables reasoning over these busi-
ness objectives with explicit consideration of behavioural
uncertainty, V ∗m.
Utilising EUm(v), the provider can, for any given qual-
ity level, determine the utility which can be probabilistically
expected, under the behavioural uncertainty, V ∗m. In order to
determine the quality level to propose in a given service pro-
vision contract, the provider must find that quality level, q ∗,
which maximises expected utility given gm(v), hm(v) and
f∗m. Differentiation of EUm(v) with respect to v yield the
gradient function EUm(v)′, and by utilisation of any root-
finding methodology on EUm(v)′, the provider can value
v at which EUm(v) is maximised, and thus the values at
which the business objectives are most closely fulfilled un-
der behavioural uncertainty. Figure 1 illustrates the maximi-
sation process, deriving the quality level which maximises
expected utility given the following definitions:
gm(v) = −v + 400 (2)
hm(v) = −v + 400 (3)
V ∗m ∼ N(200, 45) (4)
The shape of EUm(v) is determined by gm(v), hm(v)
and f ∗m. Amendments to gm(v) and hm(v) would poten-
tially yield different q∗ under homogeneous uncertainty.
The provider should therefore ensure that gm(v) and hm(v)
closely reflect business objectives, since differing functions
will offer differing tolerance to uncertainty. Any changes to
the business objectives can be simply incorporated by plug-
ging in the amended functions gm(v)′ and hm(v)′, retaining
an identical maximisation process.
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Figure 1. Maximisation of Expected Utility
3 Negative Consequences of Statistical Un-
certainty
In this section, we illustrate the negative consequences
of statistical uncertainty in the quantification of the inherent
behavioural uncertainty of the provider.
The reasoning of the provider over business objectives
and uncertainty, and the maximisation process are reliant
on the determination of f ∗m(v). Such determination yields
objective expectations of each quality level and facilitates
rational decision-making under the uncertainty. Given the
complexity of the service provision model, the potential
scale of the system, and the multitude of contributory fac-
tors to uncertainty, the objective probability distribution
f∗m(v) is infeasible to derive. The probability distribution
must instead by obtained subjectively through acquisition,
analysis and inference of past empirical data. This gives the
potential for statistical uncertainty in the quantification of
the inherent behavioural uncertainty. Let random variable
V +m denote the random variable representing quality level
derived subjectively from empirical data, and let f +m(v) de-
note the associated probability density function of this ran-
dom variable. The more closely V +m models V ∗m, the more
accurate the subjective expectations of each given quality
levels, and the more informed the reasoning and determina-
tion of the expected utility maximising quality level.
In order to illustrate the negative consequences of sta-
tistical uncertainty in V +m , we compare the expected util-
ity yielded from utilisation of f ∗m(v) and from utilisation of
f+m(v) with varying magnitudes of error, . For illustrative
purposes, we retain our definition of V ∗m given by (4) and
introduce a further definition:
V +m ∼ N(200 + µ, 45 + σ) (5)
The statistical uncertainty in this illustration is mani-
fested through inaccurate estimators of the normal distri-
bution parameters µ and σ. We denote the error in each by
−35 ≤ µ ≤ 35 and −35 ≤ σ ≤ 35. To illustrate the
effects of errors in the estimation of each parameter clearly,
we change either µ or σ exclusively. Utilising f+m with 
considered, the maximisation process was carried out using
the payment functions in (2) and (3) to yield an expected
utility maximising quality level q+ (Equation 6). The max-
imisation process was then run utilising the objective dis-
tribution f ∗m(v) to yield an objective expected utility max-
imising quality level q∗ (Equation 1).
EU+m(v) = gm(v)−
∫ vmax
v
f+m(v)dv · hm(v) (6)
Clearly q∗ is most accurate since is utilises the objective
probability distribution f ∗m(v), and therefore yields q∗, the
quality level generating the highest expected utility. Con-
versely, q+ represents the quality level generating the high-
est expected utility, given our subjective estimate of uncer-
tainty f+m(v).
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Figure 2. Error in µ / σ vs Expected Utility
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of statistical uncertainty on
EU+m(v). We compared the expected utility from the pro-
posal of q+ and q∗ using the underlying objective proba-
bility distribution f ∗m, that is Equation 1 using v+ and v∗.
This illustrates EU∗m(v) using the quality levels yielded
from the objective and subjective maximisation process, q+
and q∗. At µ = σ = 0, EU+m(v) = EU∗m(v). For
−35 ≤ µ ≤ 0, EU+m(v) → EU∗m(v), reflecting the fact
that f+m(v) more closely models f ∗m(v) and thus the quality
level yielded from the maximisation process more closely
reflects the objective uncertainty. In the case of both µ and
σ, under-estimation of behavioural uncertainty yields sig-
nificant losses in expected utility. The provider is propos-
ing quality levels which reflect a larger magnitude of be-
havioural uncertainty than is actually the case. Accordingly,
the expected utility yielded from these quality levels is sig-
nificantly lower than that which could be expected given
4
no statistical uncertainty due to the reduced revenue gen-
erated by these quality levels. As σ → 0, the statistical
uncertainty is reduced, giving increasingly objective qual-
ity level proposals and thus EU+m(v) → EU∗m(v). Over-
estimation in the case of µ yields very similar results to
under-estimation, attributable to the fact that the provider
is over-estimating his ability to deliver a given quality level
and thus risking a higher probability of making the ex post
payment to the consumer. For σ, the results are slightly
less intuitive for over-estimation. The provider is over-
estimating his ability to deliver a given quality level, yet
the expected utility loss remains extremely low. Statisti-
cal uncertainty in σ represents a mean-preserving spread of
the objective probability distribution, yielding, in the case
of the payment functions given, similar results to the objec-
tive probabilitydistribution, but with greater probabilities at-
tributed to the extremes of the distribution. In this case, the
cumulative probability distribution for a given quality level
may not change markedly, simply spreading probabilities
more evenly across a wider range of values.
Clearly, the greater the statistical uncertainty, the greater
the difference between the EU+m(v) and EU ∗m(v) For the
provider to guarantee a quality level q+, based on an inaccu-
rate f+m(v), there is a risk of loss of revenue since a more ac-
curate f+m(v) would have yielded a quality level with greater
expected utility. In order to meet quality level guarantees es-
tablished under statistical uncertainty, resources may be in-
efficiently utilised with guarantees not accurately reflecting
the underlying behavioural uncertainty. This inefficiency
may reduce the ability of the provider to fulfil the guaran-
tees of greater number of contracts, or may lead to quality
level guarantees being violated on a regular basis. Such vi-
olations have an effect not only on revenue, in the form of
the ex post payments necessitated, but also have an effect on
consumer trust since violations erode consumer trust in the
willingness and ability of the provider to deliver the quality
level guarantees. This issue is particularly damaging since
the erosion of trust is a vastly quicker process than that of
accruing trust, and trust is a particularly valuable property
in domains of self-interested, autonomous parties such as
Grid systems.
4 Cost-Constrained Monitoring Policy
This section addresses the need for mitigation of statisti-
cal uncertainty in the quality level, given the negative con-
sequences detailed in Section 3. We illustrate the use of a
monitoring policy to derive the subjective probability dis-
tribution f+m(v), and show how the association of cost with
the acquisition of empirical data in the monitoring policy
can affect EU+m(v).
The empirical data required to derive the subjective prob-
ability distribution f+m(v) is acquired through the acquisi-
tion, analysis and inference of past quality level measure-
ments. The number and frequency of measurements utilised
in this monitoring process has an associated cost, which
one can attribute to the intrusive usage of resources by the
monitoring policy, and the opportunity cost of this resource
usage. We let the notion of a monitoring level denote a
given number of measurements acquired and analysed in
our monitoring process. It is assumed that this cost can be
appropriately apportioned on a per contract basis. Let V lm
denote a continuous random variable representing the qual-
ity level of a given metric m, using monitoring level l where
lmin ≤ l ≤ lmax. Additionally, for each V lm let the subjec-
tive probability density function obtained through monitor-
ing be denoted f lm(v). For a given monitoring level l, let
the associated cost be denoted by k(l). The expected util-
ity function can now be updated to reflect the inclusion of
monitoring levels and their associated costs.
EU lm(v) = gm(v)−
∫ vmax
v
f lm(v)dv · hm(v) − k(l) (7)
For each monitoring level, we derive the subjective prob-
ability distribution through formulation of an empirical dis-
tribution [2]. The use of an empirical distribution necessi-
tates no prior assumptions of the distribution of the quality
level measurements, and consequently is very flexible. An
alternative approach could also be adopted, where the em-
pirical distribution was used to bootstrap a parametric dis-
tribution, for instance, a normal distribution. In this case,
instead of using the empirical data to derive f lm(v), it would
be utilised to derive the estimators of parameters of the dis-
tribution, in the case of a normal distribution µˆ and σˆ.
As the cost of monitoring, k(l), increases the expected
utility will decrease, ceterus paribus. Increasing cost of
monitoring, though, implies an increased amount of acqui-
sition, analysis and inference on the empirical data. By the
law of large numbers, this increased acquisition, analysis
and inference will dictate that, f+m(v) approaches f ∗m(v).
The provider must therefore find the point at which the cost
of monitoring, k(l), yields appropriate benefits in terms of
accuracy of fm + (v), otherwise the monitoring costs are
simply reducing utility. This point is heavily dictated by the
cost function k(l), which should closely reflect the oppor-
tunity cost of monitoring in the given system.
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of experimental
work performed to demonstrate the efficacy of our util-
ity model and to highlight performance of varied monitor-
ing levels on mitigating statistical uncertainty in the quality
level of a service.
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We linked the notion of monitoring level to the acqui-
sition and analysis of a given number of past quality level
measurements, the set of which we denote by S l. These
quality level measurements were assumed to adhere to the
underlying objective probability distribution, f ∗m(v) given
in (4). The cardinality of Sl as defined as:
#Sl = 10 · l (8)
The cost for a given level of monitoring, l, was defined
by the function:
k(l) = 0.5 · l (9)
The maximisation process was then executed using the
subjective probability distribution f lm(v) yielded from each
monitoring level, and the results compared. We restricted
the number of monitoring levels by defining the bounds
lmin = 1 and lmax = 20.
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Figure 3. Monitoring Level vs Expected Utility
Figure 3 demonstrates the effect of monitoring level on
expected utility. As l increases, the accuracy of f lm(v) in-
creases, but so too does the cost, k(l), which increases lin-
early with each level. Beyond l = 8 the cost of monitoring
begins to dominate the expected utility with no additional
benefits in terms of decreased statistical uncertainty.
Figure 4 and 5 illustrate the decreased statistical uncer-
tainty yielded by increased monitoring, with both quality
level and probability of quality level violation approaching
those obtained from the objective probability distribution as
l increases, that is, as l increases f lm(v) → f∗m(v). This is
in adherence to the law of large numbers, and both graph
illustrate clearly that beyond l = 8 statistical uncertainty is
not significantly reduced by increased monitoring. Beyond
l = 8, f lm(v) has minimal statistical uncertainty and accu-
rately reflects the objective probability distribution f ∗m(v).
The graph shown in Figure 5 provides an illustration of
the effect on loss of expected utility of each monitoring
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level. It shows that for small l the benefit from monitor-
ing in terms of reduction of statistical uncertainty is sig-
nificant. As the monitoring level moves beyond l = 8,
the statistical uncertainty approaches 0. This reflects the
fact that expected utility is being accurately estimated since
f lm(v) → f∗m(v). Beyond this point, no additional utility
is gained from increased monitoring, yet additional cost is
incurred.
The results clearly demonstrate that statistical uncer-
tainty can have damaging effects on the fulfilment of busi-
ness objectives of the service provider. Whilst increased
monitoring reduces the statistical uncertainty, beyond l = 8,
no significant reduction in statistical uncertainty can be at-
tributed to this increased monitoring. In this case, the cost
of l > 8 is needless and serves only to reduce expected util-
ity. The provider must therefore always monitor such that
the cost of monitoring is offset against the benefits of reduc-
tion in statistical uncertainty. This may involve the use of
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Figure 6. Loss In Expected Utility vs Monitor-
ing Level
adaptive monitoring policies if the inherent behavioural un-
certainty in the system is subject to fluctuations and trends.
6 Implementation
In this section we discuss the incorporation of our util-
ity model and monitoring policy into a lightweight manage-
ment architecture based on Representational State Trans-
fer (REST) [7]. We demonstrate the modelling of the ne-
gotiation protocol in adherence to the principals of REST,
utilising Finite State Automata (FSA) [4] to model the un-
derlying state of the protocol. Additionally, we discuss the
implementation of the maximisation process, utilising stan-
dard differentiation rules for polynomial functions, and the
bisection algorithm for root-finding.
The implementation of the utility model utilised polyno-
mial functions of the form p = anxn + · · · + a1x + a0 to
model the ex ante and ex post payment functions. In do-
ing so, the differentiation of these payment functions was
simplified, enabling standard differentiation rules for poly-
nomials to be applied. The probability density function f +m
was modelled as an empirical distribution, whose integral
was simply the cumulative density function calculated ac-
cordingl to standard empirical distribution rules. The em-
pirical distribution enabled varied sets of empirical data to
be utilised in order to yield the probability density, giving
the flexibility to represent any monitoring policy. Given
the modelling of each component term of the expected util-
ity function, the maximisation process was carried out by
differentiation of each component part, followed by execu-
tion of the bisection root-finding algorithm. This algorithm
slices the function into increasingly small sections in order
to find the root. The bisection method is a simple and reli-
able method of root-finding but alternative methods such as
Newton’s method could be utilised.
On the establishment of the quality level maximising ex-
pected utility, the contract is proposed by the provider to the
consumer. For this purpose, we devised an XML schema
for the contract structure given in Definition 2, a Java object
model mapping to this XML representation, and an XML
parser and Java object serializer to transform between these
two models. The contract, once formulated by the provider
was assigned a unique addressing reference, a URI. Consis-
tent with REST, the state of contract could be introspected
and manipulated by the consumer using this URI, in con-
junction with a concise set of state-centric methods. These
methods were provided by HTTP in our implementation:
mhttp = {get, put, post, delete}.
The state of contract was modelled with a Finite State
Automata (FSA), where the execution of m ∈ mhttp re-
quested a transition from a given contract state to another
(Figure 7).
active
quoted
acceptedterminated
uri
contract state
representation
{get, put, post, delete}
Figure 7. Contract Finite State Machine
On the completion of a successful transition, the repre-
sentation of the contract was amended to reflect this tran-
sition. For instance, a quoted contract representation takes
the structure of Definition 2, whilst a terminated contract
representation contaisn additional details pertaining to the
termination. In addition to an updated representation of
the contract state itself, the amended representation also
provides details of the permitted transitions from the new
state and how these transitions can be requested. For ex-
ample, on transition from a quoted contract to an accepted
contract, the new representation contains not only the de-
tails of acceptance, but additionally details of any method
m ∈ mhttp which can be executed, and the data required by
this method, to request a transition from accepted to active.
This is an example of the elegance of stateless interactions,
requiring no state to be held on the consumer-side relating
to the contract state. The consumer can derive the state of
the contract and the conceivable transitions from that state
all from the representation of that state.
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The monitoring policy was implemented simply from
the collection of empirical data pertaining to the delivered
quality level of each service request. All service requests
and responses pass through a central gateway enabling this
data to be collected and correlated in a straightforward man-
ner. Given that data relating to each request and response is
collected at the central gateway, the monitoring policy sim-
ply picks selected data, according to the monitoring policy,
from that collected and performing analysis and inference
for the purpose of deriving the empirical distribution. Cur-
rently, the monitoring process models resources as random
processes, but a logical extension to this implementation
would be the use of live, physical resources.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated the presence of
behavoiural uncertainty, and the potential negative conse-
quences of statistical uncertainty in the negotiation of ser-
vice provision contracts. Accordingly, we have shown how
this behavioural uncertainty can be explicitly included by
the service provider in the negotiation of service provision
contracts. Through the utilisation our utility model, the
provider can reason over the behavioural uncertainty in the
delivery of a given quality level, and in doing so can find
the quality level which most closely fulfils business objec-
tives under this uncertainty. We demonstrated using our
utility model how the provider can suffer from loss of rev-
enue, inefficient resource usage and erosion of consumer
trust, as a result of statistical uncertainty. To address the
issue of statistical uncertainty, we introduced a monitoring
policy to facilitate the acquisition of empirical quality level
data on which to derive a probability distribution, and inte-
grated consideration of this monitoring policy into our util-
ity model. A cost was attributed to each level of monitor-
ing, and we investigated the effect on expected utility of
increased levels of monitoring. It was shown that beyond
a given level of monitoring, the benefits of increased accu-
racy are surpassed by the cost of the monitoring policy. The
practical efficacy of our approach was illustrated through
the incorporation of the utility model and monitoring policy
into a lightweight management architecture based on Rep-
resentational State Transfer.
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